ABSTRACT. In this article a key encapsulation mechanism is presented which is based on squaring function, where the input element is from QR + N , where QR + N denotes the signed quadratic residue group, and N is a Blum integer. The article presents the soundness, the efficiency and the proof of CCA security of the proposed mechanism.
Introduction
The security of encryption systems depends on the resistance of these systems against well defined attacks. Between these attacks the most important is the chosen ciphertext attack. According to the results of current researches the encryption systems that are secure against chosen ciphertext attacks or can be converted in such systems, became very important. The newer literature [4] introduces the key encapsulation and data encapsulation concepts which could potentially replace the classical public-key encryption systems.
R a b i n in [6] introduced the squaring function, and proved that inverting this function is as hard as factoring integers. On the other hand, it is well known that the basic Rabin cryptosystem based on squaring function is completely insecure against a chosen ciphertext attack. The proposed key encapsulation mechanism is based on squaring function too, with the differences that the input element is from QR + N , where QR + N denotes the signed quadratic residue group, and N is a Blum integer. This group was used by H o f h e i n z et al. [5] , to construct a public-key encryption system which is secure against a chosen ciphertext attack. To achieve this property the authors modified the Blum-Goldwasser publickey encryption system, published by B l u m and G o l d w a s s e r in 1985 [3] . This system uses multiple squaring to encapsulate the randomly generated key, and the additional element added for consistency check is also calculated with high exponent.
The proposed key-encapsulation mechanism in contrast with the mechanism proposed in [5] uses only one squaring on randomly generated key after which it determines its hash value. According to this, the additional element is calculated with one squaring. The security of a system against a chosen ciphertext attack can be proved by using the factoring assumption and the target-collision resistance properties of the underlying hash functions.
Basic definitions

Important attacks
Cryptography recognizes the following two most important attacks:
• Chosen plaintext attack (CPA): A system that is secure against a chosen plaintext attack ensures security against a passive adversary. It is said that such a system is CPA-secure. To achieve CPA-security one can introduce randomization techniques.
• Chosen ciphertext attack (CCA): A system that is secure against a chosen ciphertext attack ensures security against an active adversary. It is said that such a system is CCA-secure. To achieve CCA-security one can check the consistency of the ciphertext.
In 1998 B l e i n c h e n b a c h e r [1] successfully attacked RSA encryption and since that the cryptography community accepted that the right security requirement on a public-key encryption system is to achieve CCA-security.
Public-key encryption system
In 2003 C r a m e r and S h o u p [4] gave a general definition for a CCA-secure hybrid public-key encryption system (HPKE). They introduced the notion of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) that can be used to encapsulate, to encrypt a randomly generated key using public-key encryption techniques. After this the key can be used in symmetric key encryption system (SKE) which encrypts the actual data. They proved that by combining a CCA-secure KEM with a CCA--secure SKE the result will be a CCA-secure HPKE.
Ò Ø ÓÒ 1º A CCA-secure hybrid public-key encryption system is defined together with 3 algorithms, on (K, M, C):
• The key generation algorithm is a randomized algorithm, that generates a uniform and random public-key pk and secret-key sk, when inputted 1 k .
It is denoted: (pk, sk)
, where (pk, sk) ∈ K × K, and k is the security parameter of the system, in most cases indicates the length of the key.
• The encryption algorithm Enc P KE (pk, m) consists of two algorithms.
-The key encapsulation is a CCA-secure randomized algorithm, when inputted pk, it produces a randomly generated key, and its cipher value. It is denoted by (key, cipher) ← Enc KEM (pk), where key
The data encapsulation is a CCA-secure SKE, when key and m are inputted, it computes the cipher value of m: c ← Enc SKE (key, m).
• The decryption algorithm Dec P KE (sk, c, cipher) does the followings:
-If (c, cipher) is not a proper encryption, it outputs REJECT, and stops.
-If the output of key decapsulation algorithm Dec KEM is REJECT, then decryption algorithm outputs REJECT, and stops. -Else * run key decapsulation algorithm which is a deterministic algorithm, it takes input sk, cipher and computes key (key) ← Dec KEM (sk, cipher), * run the data decapsulation algorithm which is a deterministic algorithm, it takes input key and c, m ← Dec SKE (key, c), * the output of Dec P KE (sk, c, cipher) is m.
In practice the key encapsulation mechanisms' security always depends on widely believed, but not proved assumptions. The proposed KEM security is based on the factoring assumption and on the target-collision resistance property of the underlying hash functions.
In order to introduce these notions the definition of negligible function is needed.
Negligible functions
Ò Ø ÓÒ 2º A function f (·) is negligible if for every polynomial (·) there exists an integer n 0 such that for all integers n > n 0 it holds that f (n) < 1 (n) .
Factoring assumption
In cryptography one of the most commonly used assumption is the factoring assumption.
The factoring assumption assumes that the following function is negligible in k for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) F algorithms
where Gen(1 k ) is a PPT algorithm that returns N, P, Q with the following properties:
• N = P · Q, • P = Q = 3 (mod 4), namely P and Q are Blum integers,
• P = 2p + 1, Q = 2q + 1, where p, q are odd prime numbers, namely P and Q are safe primes, • the bit length of p and q is k/2 − 1: |p| = |q| = k/2 − 1.
The group of signed quadratic residues
Nowadays more systems use the group of signed quadratic residues, which has some very useful properties.
Let QR + N = {|x| : x ∈ QR N } denote the set of signed quadratic residues modulo N , where |x| denotes the absolute value of x, and QR N denote the set of quadratic residues modulo N :
and N is a composite number generated with Gen(1 k ), specified above. This set has some interesting properties, proved already in [5] :
• QR • a uniformly and randomly generated g element will be a generator except with the probability
Target-collision resistant property
To prove the CCA-security of the proposed mechanism a target-collision resistant hash function is used.
Let T R: X → Y be a target-collision resistant hash function. The following function is defined, for an algorithm B
Adv T CR,B (T R) = Pr x ← X, y ← B(x) : x = y, T R(x) = T R(y) .
For a target-collision resistant hash function it is true that for all PPT adversaries, the function Adv T CR,B (T R) is negligible in k.
The proposed scheme uses two target-collision resistant hash function, the first is T : QR
l T , and the second is H : QR
The proposed KEM
The scheme
In order to present the scheme the key generation, the key encapsulation, and the key decapsulation algorithm are presented.
The key generation algorithm Gen KEM (1 k ) is a randomized algorithm which generates a uniform and random public-key pk and secret-key sk when it is inputted as follows:
• let N be a composite number generated with Gen(1 k ), which is described in Section 2.4,
• the algorithm's output is pk = (N, g, X) , and sk = (α).
The key encapsulation algorithm Enc KEM operates on input pk, and does the following: 
, S).
The key decapsulation algorithm Dec KEM operates on input α as secret-key and (G 2 , S), and does the following:
N does not hold, the algorithm outputs REJECT, and stops,
(1) does not hold, the algorithm outputs REJECT, and stops, • else -because 0 < t < 2 l T it follows that c < l T , so using the extended Euclidean algorithm a, b, c can be calculated from the following Diophantine equation
where 2 c is the greatest common divisor of t, and 2 1+l T . -the algorithm's output is (key), where
The soundness of the scheme
The soundness of the scheme can be verified by elementary calculations. It is clear that the values of S, and G 2 can be written in the following form
To verify the correctness of equation (1) one can calculate
To verify the correctness of key's computation one can calculate
The security of the scheme
To prove the chosen ciphertext security of the proposed scheme the following game is defined.
The game is defined between a polynomial-time, probabilistic adversary A and its environment, called the challenger with the following steps:
(1) the challenger chooses the functions T, and H, 
A queries the challenger, and the challenger computes: 
